Second Set of Questions on the Posterior Analytics

by Simon of Faversham

Question 1

            “All teaching and all learning” etc. Concerning the Posterior Analytics it is asked whether this proposition is true, “all teaching” etc.

            And it seem that it is not, for as it is with sensory cognition, so it is with intellectual cognition. But sensory teaching does not arise from preexisting cognition. Therefore etc.

            Again, there are many things which are known naturally; therefore they do not arise from

preexisting cognition. The antecedent is obvious, since principles are of this sort.

            The opposing view is clearly true from what the Philosopher says here.

            In response to this, it must be understood, in accord with what Alexander says here, that there are two manners of cognition, cognition through discovery and through learning. Hence the intent of the Philosopher, according to Alexander, is, “every teaching” etc., that is, from preexisting discovery. But Alexander imposes this interpretation on the text, and if he said this, he spoke badly, since he said that our every cognition arises from prior discovery. For if this is so there must be another cognition prior to the first cognition, or else if we have learned anything at all we have already learned an infinite number of things beforehand. Hence it must be said that all teaching arises from intellectual precognition, and because of this two contrary things must be explained. The first is that every cognition arises from preexisting cognition, and the second is that it arises from intellectual cognition. The proof of the first: Since nothing else is understood by this statement that all teaching and all learning arise from preexisting cognition than this, that every conclusion arises from preexisting cognition. But a conclusion is a name for something unknown, and we arrive at the cognition of an unknown through something known.

            Again, the argument of Themistius is to this effect. Everything which is moved has something else to which it is moved; if then we are to cognize a conclusion it is necessary that we have some cognition about the conclusion beforehand.

            Again, the proof of the second: Since the cognition of a conclusion comes from the cognition of principles, it is from intellectual cognition. And cognition of principles is from the cognition of terms, and the cognition of terms is from sensory cognition. Hence, bringing all this together, the Philosopher said that all teaching and all learning arise from preexisting sensory cognition, and that is the end of the series.

            In response to the arguments, in response to the first argument I maintain that there is a similitude here because just as sense is potential, and arises from what is first in actuality, so also the intellect. But there is a dissimilitude in this as well, for intellectual cognition is caused from sensory cognition, but not conversely. But, someone might argue to the contrary, the posterior is not the cause of the prior, and sense is posterior to intellect, therefore etc. I maintain that “prior” is said in two ways, either according to substance and perfection, or according to generation. Sense is prior according to generation, and intellect according to substance and perfection.

            In response to the other argument, I maintain that there are two ways in which something is known naturally, either because something is in the substance of our soul, and in this way nothing is naturally known by us since then our soul would not be like a blank tablet. Or it can be naturally known because our intellect has an immediate capacity to understand it, and first principles are of this sort. Hence there is a prior sensory cognition of these, but not a prior intellectual cognition.

Question 2

            Next it is asked whether it is possible for there to be a science of demonstration.

            And it seems it is not, for if there were a science of demonstration, since science occurs through demonstration, I ask concerning this demonstration whether there is a science of it or not. If not, then neither is there science of the first, if there is, I will ask about that science as before, and so on ad infinitum.

            Again, one does not have knowledge of a conclusion unless he first knows a demonstration for that conclusion; if, then, he first knows himself to have a demonstration for that conclusion, before that he knew himself to have a demonstration for that demonstration, therefore he has demonstration before he knows demonstration. But this is impossible. Therefore etc.

            The opposite view is obvious through what the Philosopher says here.

            I reply to the question that: (1) There can be a science of demonstration, (2) there is a science of demonstration, and (3) there is a science of demonstration through demonstration.

            Proof of the first point: There can be a science of anything which is understandable by the intellect, and has properties and passions. But demonstration is like that.

            Proof of the second: There is a science of that which is common to every special science; but demonstration is common to every special science; therefore etc. And this science is common, not special, since it is decided by the same argument in one science and another, and so it is decided in a common science. Logic is like this, but since logic is in one part about demonstration and in another part about probable syllogism, it must be understood that as far as that part which is about demonstration is concerned, it is merely a teaching science, and not a science in use, since it proceeds from common things, and demonstration in the special sciences is not from common things. But insofar as the other part is concerned, it is both a teaching science and a science in use. It is a teaching science since it teaches from which and what sort it is to be argued probably, and it is science in use because its operation occurs within the other sciences.

            Proof of the third point: Every science hands down some teaching through demonstration. Since logic is a science it passes on its knowledge about demonstration through demonstration, and this is known through demonstration which is the same in species as the demonstration one learns about but not the same in number. And as it is not absurd to proceed to infinity in a circular manner in generation, so also it is not absurd in demonstration. Thus it is in the operation of the intellect when it understands another, in understanding the other it understands itself to understand, and afterwards it understands itself to understand itself, and so on ad infinitum.

            In response to the arguments: In response to the first I grant that demonstration arises through demonstration, nor is it absurd that there should be a process to infinity there. Alternatively, if one cannot proceed to infinity in demonstration a first demonstration can be received in some sense, as we can receive a demonstration about this rule: every whole is greater than its part, and a house is a certain whole, therefore etc. All of this can be grasped by the senses, hence if demonstration has thus been produced in the mind, I believe that one has it through discovery.

            I reply to the second objection that science is of two sorts. In one sort the science and its way of knowing differ, as for instance in all special sciences. In the other sort the science and its way of knowing do not differ, and logic is like this since it is its own way of knowing. For one knows demonstration and how to demonstrate simultaneously, so that a logician may know a demonstration, and there is no need for him to have a demonstration for it. So the major premise is only to be understood as applicable to the special sciences.

Question 3

            Next we ask about the part,”Now it is necessary to know beforehand in two ways, etc.,” whether there are two cognitions beforehand as he says, namely what it is and that it is, and in the second place, whether the definitions indicating what a reality is and what the name signifies are one and the same.

            Concerning the first we argue that it is not, for every question is a certain cognition beforehand, for everything that is asked can in some way be cognized beforehand—otherwise it would never be discovered. But there are four questions, as the Philosopher has it in the second book of this work. Therefore etc.

            Again, to whatever is cognized beforehand, there corresponds its cognition beforehand. But there are three things cognized beforehand, namely the subject, passion, and axiom (dignitas). Therefore etc.

            Again, just as cognition beforehand that it is occurs, so also cognition before of what sort it is, and how much, and so on for the others <that is, the other categories>. Therefore etc.

            The Philosopher takes the opposite view.

            I reply to the question that there are only two cognitions beforehand, and as the philosopher has it in the second book, there are four questions, namely if it is, whether it is, what it is, and why it is. And therefore there are four things we truly know, namely the aforesaid. From this, it is argued that there are only two cognitions beforehand, since since of the number of those knowables those alone are cognized before before demonstration of which cognition is not to be had through demonstration, but what the subject is and what its name signifies, and that the subject is, and what it is that the passion signifies, and that an axiom is <true>, is not to be had through demonstration, and therefore there are only two cognitions beforehand, since these alone are cognized before demonstration. Proof of the minor: since quidditative cognition of the subject is the cause of every passion which can be demonstrated of the subject, and if that is the cause, it is not to be had through demonstration, since it is before every demonstration. In the same way, it is necessary to know concerning the passion what it is, since nothing can be demonstrated of anything unless we know what it <the item to be demonstrated> is. Since, therefore, something must be proved of the passion, it is necessary to cognize beforehand what it is, and similarly of an axiom.

            But you will say, it seems that we ought to have three cognitions beforehand, namely what the subject is according to its substance, in the second place, what the name signifies, and in the third, that it is. It must be said that one of these cognitions beforehand is reduced to the others, namely that which is according to the substance and nature of the subject to that concerning what it is that is signified by the name. For it is never known what is signified through the name unless it is known what the reality is which is made the subject.

            To the arguments, to the first I reply that the number of questions and the number of cognitions beforehand do not arise from the same thing, for the number of questions arises from those which we truly know, are known through demonstration, of which sort there are four; but the number of cognitions beforehand arises from those things which are assumed for the sake of demonstration, and such are only two, what it is and that it is.

            To the other, I reply and grant that there are three things cognized beforehand in number, namely the subject, axiom, and passion, but they reduce to two, to the complex and the incomplex, and of such it is cognized beforehand what it is and that it is.

            To the other, I reply that it cannot be cognized beforehand that something is of some sort or quantity, since understanding something to be of a certain sort is understanding a quality to inhere in it, and we know a quality inheres in something through demonstration, and nothing known through demonstration can be cognized beforehand, and so we cannot cognize that something is of some sort or quantity beforehand.

Question 4

            Next we inquire about the second question, namely, whether the definitions indicating what a thing is and what the name signifies are one and the same.

            And it is argued that they are, since the what it is of a reality is signified by the name of the reality, for instance, the what it is of human being is signified by the name of a human being. But the definition of human being indicates the what it is of human being, therefore it indicates what is signified by the name of human being, and consequently what the name signifies. Therefore the definition indicating what a thing is and the definition of the name are the same.

            On the other hand, it is argued thus: a definition indicating what it is of a name and what it is of a reality is not the same, since a reality and a name are not the same, but the definition of the name indicating what the name signifies is not a definition indicating what the reality is.

            In response to this question I maintain that the definition indicating what it is of the name and the definition indicating what it is of the reality are not the same. For the Philosopher, in Posterior Analytics II, says that the question what it is presupposes the question if it is, and therefore Avicenna says in his Metaphysics that whoever says something is a reality and has a whatness and says it is not, does not belong to the company of those who know. From this, I accept that a definition signifying what a reality is is only of a being, but a definition indicating what a name signifies is of beings and non-beings alike.

            Again, Themistius says, commenting on this passage, that if anyone orders (principiat) a boy to go to a stable where there are both horses and donkeys, and lead out a horse, he will lead out a horse, and he would not have done this if he had not known what is signified by the name of a horse, and yet he does not know what a horse is according to its substance.

            Again, we can know what is signified by the name of a passion before demonstration, but what the passion is we cannot know before demonstration, since one knows this from the passion’s inherence in the subject. So Avicenna says that of each of those things of which there is a definition signifying what it is of the name, there is also a definition signifying what it is for the reality to be, either according to the being it has in the soul or according to its being in the eternal reality. And hence there is not for each thing of which there is a definition indicating what is signified by the name, also a definition indicating what it is for the reality to be eternally. For we can know what is signified by the name of a vacuum, and yet we can know that a vacuum is not, since it in fact is not. And the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV that we can know what is signified by a name, not knowing what the reality is. Avicenna says that everything with a definition has being either in eternal reality or the soul.

            In reply to the argument, when it is said “the what it is of a reality is signified by the name of the reality,” I reply that this is true. And you say, “therefore the definition indicating what it is of a reality is a definition indicating what is signified by the name of the reality.” I hold that this does not follow, for even though it follows that the definition will indicate what it is according to its substance that is signified by the name of the reality, still, to say this is not to say what the name signifies.

Question 5

            Next we ask about the part “To know, in our opinion,” etc., first, whether knowledge can be generated in us through teaching.

            And it seems it cannot, since it is impossible for that to be generated in us through teaching which is not generated in us at all. But knowledge is not generated in us at all. Therefore etc. Proof of the minor premise: That which comes to belong to something through its being calmed and brought to rest is not generated in it, since being calmed and at rest are opposed to generation, which is change. But knowledge comes to the soul through its being calmed and brought to rest, for the Philosopher says that in being calmed and brought to rest the soul comes to be knowing and wise. So knowledge is not generated in our soul. Therefore etc.

            Again, if a teacher generated knowledge in us this would occur through knowledge. But it cannot be done through his knowledge since then his knowledge would have an active power, for in every case what an agent uses to act has an active power over that on which he acts. But knowledge does not have active power because it belongs to the first species of quality. Therefore a teacher cannot generate knowledge in anyone through his knowledge, therefore knowledge cannot be generated in anyone through teaching.

            The contrary is argued thus: That is perfect that can generate in another something similar to itself. If then a teacher is perfect in knowledge he will be able to generate a similar habitus in a student, and so will be able to generate knowledge in someone through teaching.

            It must be understood that the opinion of Plato was that knowledge is in our soul’s inmost part intrinsically, so that it has all knowledge and every habitus of knowledge actually and from the beginning due to its origin. And when he was asked, “since we have in us the habitus of knowledge, why do we not bring it to mind when we wish to?” he responded that this was due to our union with the body, for from such a union one is inclined to sensory pleasures that strongly draw a man away from interest in knowledge and from actually bringing it to mind. Hence a soul united to a body cognizes everything universally, but through turning to the separated idea it has cognition of all things in particular.

            But this opinion is no good, for the Philosopher says, in De Anima III, that the intellect, before it learns or discovers, is none of those things that are, and is, as it were, a blank tablet, in capacity to every knowledge. But this would not be if our soul had a habitus of knowledge from the beginning, due to its origin.

            Again, the Philosopher, in De Anima II, says that someone can he in capacity when he knows in two ways, first because he has a habitus of knowledge, but does not actually bring it to mind, as with the geometer who has a habitus of geometry, but does not actually bring it to mind; second because he neither has a habitus nor actually brings it to mind, as with a boy who knows nothing of geometry. But it is obvious that if there were knowledge in us as Plato thinks the boy would not be said to know in capacity in the aforesaid way, so that this opinion is directly opposed to the philosopher.

            It must be said, then, that knowledge can be generated in us by something extrinsic and through teaching. To make this evident it must be noticed that some things arise from art, as, for instance, a house, some arise from nature, as plants and other such things do, and some by both art and nature, for instance health. For knowledge arises partly from art and partly from nature, from nature as from a principal agent, but from art as from an instrumental agent, exactly as it happens in the generation of health. For nature is the principal agent in causing health in animals, regulating the undigested humors, and expelling superfluous humors. The doctor, who is the agent by art, is an instrumental and assisting agent. For he aids nature through positioning, through baths, and through plasters, and if the internal natural power is deficient the doctor can never bring about health. It is similar in the generation of knowledge in us, for it is generated in us by a teacher as an assisting agent who removes hindrances. But it is generated in another way by what is knowable per se, in the way appropriate to an intrinsic and principle agent. For example, the knowledge of this conclusion is generated in a student if he knows (sciat) that per se known (notum) proposition that an extrinsic angle of a triangle is equal to the sum of the two interior angles opposite it. And if he knows that, then the teacher applies it to the conclusion and produces knowledge in him by removing what prevents it. But if the student does not know that the extrinsic angle etc., then it is necessary that the teacher resolve this progressively until he reaches the nature (ratio) of the being <i.e. the various geometrical figures involved> and the terms <i.e. the nominal definitions of the terms>, for if it has these no intellect can be ignorant. Hence, if the teacher needs to cause knowledge in the student it is necessary that the student presuppose something known per se in its nature.

            And with this in mind Grosseteste said that if we wish to speak truly neither does he teach who makes sounds eternally, nor does the letter teach in writing, where there is eternal vision, but these two only move and excite, and the true teacher is what illuminates the mind and shows forth the truth. And what is this? Surely the nature (ratio) of first principles which, according to what Albert says, are first lights illuminating the possible intellect.

            In response to the first argument, when it is said, “it is impossible to generate knowledge in us, therefore not even through teaching,” I reply that the consequence is necessary but deny the antecedent. And when it is proved that what comes to one through being calm and brought to rest is not generated, it is true of that generation which accompanies the arrival of a contrary and destruction without qualification, but it is not true of that generation which marks the attainment of a perfection or change which is owed to itself per se, as when air becomes, or is generated, transparent. And in this way knowledge can be generated in the soul through its being calmed and brought to rest.

            In response to the other I reply that knowledge certainly does have such an active virtue as suffices to acting as an assistant. Or else, it can be said that although knowledge by itself is not an active quality, since it is generated through a significant expression, it also acts on students through such an expression. For the expression is formed by the teacher and received in the student.

Question 6

            Next it is asked whether it is possible for us to know anything.

            And it seems that it is not, since we do not know any truth unless we know the cause which is first without qualification, but we cannot know the cause which is first without qualification; therefore we know no truth at all. The major premise is explained as follows: The first cause is the cause of every truth, but the cognition of the cause is required for the cognition of the effect, whence the cognition of the first cause is required for the cognition of every truth. The minor premise is also obvious from the author of De Causis, who says that the first cause is above every explanatory account (narratio), and the tongue lacks an explanatory account of it. But he uses `explanatory account’ for `cognition’. The first cause, then, exceeds every cognition of our intellect,’ therefore etc.

            Again, there is nothing that does not have contrary judges. For even concerning the first principle there arise judges and opponents contrary to one another. By whatever reason, then, the judgment of one is to stand, by the same reason does the judgment of the other stand. But if there is no judgment more to be believed, then it is not possible to demonstrate that one knows anything. Therefore it is obvious that knowledge of any reality is impossible for us.

            On the other hand: It is argued that a natural desire is not directed to what is impossible so that it is in vain. But all men naturally desire to acquire some knowledge, therefore it is possible for each human being to do so, so that it is possible for us to know something. And this is the argument of the Commentator on the second book of the Metaphysics.