Questions on the Third Book of On the Soul

                                                                                    By Simon of Faversham

                                                                                    Edited by D. Sharp

                                                                                    Translated by John Longeway

Question 1

            It is asked about our intellect whether it was made at some time or exists from eternity.

            And Averroës seems to intend that it is not made from scratch commenting on Physics VIII, where he says that the old will does not make something new except by using something old, namely the motion of the sky. From this it is argued that everything made at some time is made using the motion of the sky. But the soul is not made using the motion of the sky, for it is produced immediately by the First. Therefore etc.

            Again, Proclus said that whatever the First made It made through Its being. But the First Agent is always the same. Therefore whatever is immediately produced by the First is always the same, and so is not made at some time.

            Again, Avicenna in his Metaphysics VI said that if something arises by motion that was not earlier, this is not through the substance of the agent. But the soul arose through the substance of the First. Therefore it is not made in time. And this is clear.

            On the other hand, it is argued that the Philosopher says in Metaphysics XII that no material form is before the production of the composite, but some remain after the destruction of the composite, for instance, if it is the soul, not all of it, but the intellect. So the intellect is not before the composite, although it remains after its destruction, and so it originates at some time.

            The Commentator replied to this question that the intellect is from eternity and moves a body from eternity, even though it is sometimes separated from some body. And this argument moved him—a sufficient agent in which nothing is lacking produces an effect similar to itself. But the First Agent is like this. Therefore etc. And so the soul does not originate at any time, but is eternal. And this seems to be the Philosopher’s view in Physics VIII, since otherwise something new would occur in the First Agent. This seems to presuppose something false, for it supposes that the First Agent acts from a necessity of its nature, and if this is assumed, the proposition follows. But it is false, since the First Agent must act in such a way that it is master of its action; but if it acted from the necessity of its nature, it would not be master of its action, since it could not refrain from acting. Therefore etc.

            Now although power, form and will are the same in the First Agent, they differ as far as we are concerned, for power executes, reason discerns, and will commands. Therefore, he produces all things through the will. Hence I reply that it is not contradictory for the intellect to have been from eternity, but neither is it necessary. Proof of the first: Although the cause precedes the effect without qualification according to perfection, it can occur at the same time according to duration, as is apparent in the sun and its rays, and in principles and conclusions of demonstrations, for both are eternal. Hence, although the intellect is caused by the First Agent, it is not contradictory for it to have been from eternity. Now this same is not necessary, since the will of God is the cause of realities. Therefore because God does not necessarily will it to be from eternity, it is not necessary that it be from eternity. But God does not necessarily will the intellect to be from eternity. for he wills nothing to be from eternity except Himself, for everything else is destructible at his will. Therefore etc.

            As to the arguments, in reply to the first, when it is argued that everything that is made etc., I reply that everything that is made through movement and change is made through the motion of the sky. But since the soul is not made through movement and change, therefore it is not necessary that it be made through the motion of the sky.

            To the second, when it is argued that whatever the First does etc., it is true that whatever the First does it does through its being, which is its will. You will claim that its will is its own. I hold that this is true, yet it can produce something new. And you will claim, that in that case a change is produced in it. I hold that this is not necessary, and this is clear form the opinion of the Expositor which he puts in Physics VIII: If I have a will to run after three days have passed, and I run once those three days are past, no change occurs in my will. Thus the First Cause, willing from eternity to produce the intellect of Socrates in a certain time, if He should then produce it, His will is not changed. And still, you will say that now He produces and earlier He did not, therefore He is changed. I reply that this novelty does not attend on the producer, but on the product.

            In reply to the third argument, when it is argued that if something makes a motion, etc., I reply hta if the saying of Avicenna has any truth, it must be understood to apply to agents having matter, for among these what produces the effect is not a sufficient cause of the effect. But the First is a cause sufficient for its effect, and therefore, notwithstanding its novelty, the effect can be produced by the First through its substance.

Question 2

            It is asked whether the intellect is made through natural change (motusmet transmutationem).

            And it seems that it is, since everything produced from scratch by a particular agent arises through natural change. But the intellect arises from scratch by a particular agent. Therefore etc. The Commentator explains the minor premise commenting on Metaphysics VII, and he says that the agent giving the form and changing the matter is the same—but a particular agent changes the matter, therefore etc.

            Again, according to the Philosopher a human being is due to its a human being bringing it to be naturally. But a human being is a human being through its intellect. Therefore the intellect is from a natural coming-to-be.

            Again, the intellectual and the sensitive are from one substance of the soul, that is, denying any degree in them. But the sensitive is from a coming-to-be, and therefore so is the intellectual.

            On the other hand, it is argued that everything changed through natural change is corporeal. But the intellect is not corporeal. Therefore nothing is brought to it through natural change.

            As the Commentator reports here, Alexander assumed the intellect to be a certain power caused by elements, which the Agent Intellect above illuminates. Now he proves that every kind of form is produced by the elements arranged in various ways, first the form of minerals, of which the kinds are stones, silver, and so on, which are produced in the belly of the earth, then the form of plants, and so on. And Alexander’s argument was this—every form of changeable matter is introduced through natural change, but the intellect is a form of changeable matter; therefore etc.

            Albert says that although Alexander often spoke well, here he explained things in the worst possible way, for the power which cognizes immaterial and incorporeal realities is not caused by the elements, but the intellect is like this; therefore, etc. He argues the contrary in two way. The first is that if it were from the elements, it would be material, and then it would not grasp all things, which is contrary to the Philosopher. Again, the intellect would grasp the particular and not the universal, but this is false, for the intellect deals with universals, and the senses with particulars.

            Hence it must be held that the intellect does not arise through natural change, nor from any particular agent, wince the effect is not nobler than its cause. But the immaterial is nobler than the material, and the intellect is immaterial. Therefore it cannot be produced by any material agent. Therefore it cannot be produced through natural change. Therefore it is brought into being by creation, from which it immediately follows that it is produced immediately by the First Agent, since every instrumental agent acts with something presupposed. Now eveyr agent other than the First Agent is an instrument with respect to the First. Therefore every such agent presupposes another. Therefore that which produces something with nothing presupposed is the First Agent. Now nothing is presupposed in the production of the intellect, for it does not arise from matter; therefore it is produced immediately by the First Agent.

            In response to the arguments, to the first, when it is said that every effect etc., I grant the major premise, and deny the minor. To this assumption the Commentator responds that the agent giving the form is the same etc. I reply that “form” is two-fold. There are some which are brought forth from the capacity of matter, and such are those which do not have any being other than their existence in matter, and the intellect is not such, and the Commentator did not mean to talk about such. Others are not led forth from the capacities of matter, and the Commentator means to talk about these. And you will say that prime matter is potentially all forms which are in actuality in the Prime Mover, according the Commentator on Metaphysics IX. But the intellect is in actuality in the Prime Mover, therefore it is in prime matter potentially, and so it is brought forth from the capacity of matter. I reply that all forms what are in the Prime Mover, considered as a mover, are in prime matter potentially, and such are as many as are brought forth through motion, but intellect is not in their number.

            As to the second argument, I reply that a human being brings a human being to be because he disposes semen to the leading in of the intellect by changing the matter as regards certain active and passive qualities, and, the matter being thus disposed, the giver of forms, that is, God, infuses the intellect.

            As to the third argument, when it is argued that the sensitive and intellectual etc., I grant the major premise. And you reply next that the sensitive is in a human being through what brings it to be. I reply that the substance of the sensible soul in a human being is not from what brings it to be, for it is the same soul in a human being that is animal, vegetable, and rational. And therefore as the substnace of a rational soul is not caused from what brings to be, thus neither is the substance of the sensible soul. This is because when a human being is most complete, it is not brought to be by a single bringing to be, like a mineral, but first the vegetative is brought in, and, this withdrawing, the sensible comes next, and this withdrawing, the intellect, which has all these virtually, is introduced.

Question 3

            It is asked whether the intellect is immaterial; and first, it is asked whether it is a passive power.

            And it is argued that it is not. Every passion that is produced arises from a substance. Therefore everything passive is corporeal. But the intellect is not corporeal. Therefore etc.

            Again, the Commentator says on Book IX of the Metaphysics that every active capacity reduces to a primary act, and so every passive capacity reduces to a primary passive thing, which is matter. Therefore everything that suffers action suffers it through matter. But the intellect has no matter. Therefore etc.

             On the other hand, everything that is sometimes thus, and sometimes not, suffers action. But the intellect is like this. Therefore, etc.

            As to the question, I reply that two things are required in a passion strictly so-called, change and reception. Hence I hold that the intellect is not strictly said to suffer because it is not changed, though it is said to suffer in so far as it receives. I prove that it does not change since every change is by reason of contrariety, but what comes to the intellect is not a contrary, since it is not material as such. Therefore etc.

            Hence, Themistius says that the manner of reception is four-fold, for some receive true, real forms , some intentional forms. Of those receiving real forms some receive forms new, like matter, and some forms that are not new, like the sky. And of those receiving the intentions of forms, some receive them new, as the possible intellect, and some not new, as an intelligence does.

            In reply to the arguments, when it is argued that every passion etc., I reply that it is true concerning the passion which arises through a change (per transmutationem). And you hold that everything passive is corporeal. This is true of those things that are passive, strictly speaking, but the intellect is not passive strictly speaking, and therefor it is not corporeal strictly speaking.

            As to the other, I reply that if the Commentator understands that every passive capacity leads back to a capacity of matter, which is subject to things that produce and destroy, this is a false understanding. For four kinds of matter are found in beings. One of these kinds of matter resides in a capacity to receive the form and be deprived of it, and such is the matter of things that can be produced or destroyed, Another resides in a capacity for the form alone, and such is in supercelestial things. And another resides in the capacity to understand, and such is the possible intellect. But a fourth is found in the capacity for being, and every passive capacity is reduced to this passive capacity. Hence I hold that everything that suffers action suffers it through matter. Now the intellect does not have matter. Therefore the intellect is not strictly passive.

Question 4

            It is asked concerning the possible intellect whether it is necessary that it have an intelligible innate to it for it to understand actually.

            And it seems that it is. That which has a cognition innately within it before it receives any learning has an intelligible innately within it. But the possible intellect before it receives any learning has a cognition innately within it. Therefore etc. The major premise is obvious, and the minor will be explained. Aristotle held in Posterior Analytics I, against Plato, that everything anyone learns, they know beforehand universally, but are ignorant of beforehand in particular. Therefore before the possible intellect learns something it has knowledge of it universally, and this is innate.

            Again, Averroes claims, on Metaphysics II, that there are some things in the genus of beings that are like the doorway in a house, and are hidden from no one and are naturally possessed by us, and such are first principles. From this it is argued that whoever has first principles innately has some intelligible innately. Therefore, etc.

            Again, Averroes in the same place, the second chapter, where the Philosopher proves the situation with material causes, he claims that a knower is not produced from a knower within, nor from a knower without, but in some middle way. Therefore the intellect, when it learns something, is not in pure potentiality for understanding. But it is in pure potentiality if it does not have any intelligible innate to it. Therefore it must have some intelligible innate to it.

            Again, the Philosopher says here that the intellect is like a blank tablet prepared to receive pictures. Therefore there is some preparation for the intellect to understand, and that would not happen unless there is an innate intelligible. Therefore it will have some intelligible innately.

            On the other hand, it is argued thus: A power which is not of any intelligible before it understands in actuality does not have any intelligible innate in it. Therefore etc.

            Some have held that the possible intellect has an intelligible innately, and this is nothing other than the agent intellect illuminating the possible intellect. And they explain this through an example when they say that there is light in the case of vision, and through it the vision is moved to seeing every visible thing. Thus they assume in the intellect an agent intellect as an innate intelligible, and through this the intellect is moved to understand every intelligible. This position is not true, for if the intellect had such an intelligible, it would be maximally proportioned to the intellect, but this light is not proportional to it, since the intellect is in a way material , and in a not, and so this must be true as well of that intelligible. But those who take up this position assume that this light is wholly immaterial, and so it cannot be innate to the intellect. Again, what they advance is also false, namely that the vision has light engrafted by nature, and that it is the primary object of vision. Even if it were true that light is engrafted in it by nature, still it would not be the primary object of vision, since then vision would always see, since that light would always be present to vision.

            There is another opinion which assumes that the possible intellect has the intelligible innately within it. And they hold that these intelligibles are first principles. And this is what the Commentator seems to intend, and also the Philosopher in Metaphysics II. [993b27], who says that it is not possible to err naturally about first principles, since they come to one who has them. This is not true, since just as the possible intellect is that from which all things arise, so the agent intellect is that by which all things are made. But is first principles are innate in the possible intellect, then the agent intellect did not produce them, and this is contrary to what the Philosopher means.

            Again, if anything is a first intelligible, it will have no other intelligible before it. But it is clear that these intelligibles have intelligibles before them, namely terms, for we cognize principles insofar as we cognize their terms. Therefore etc.

            It must be said that the possible intellect does not have any intelligible innately within itself before it actually understands. For the Philosopher says that the intellect is like a tablet upon which nothing is written, but on which many things can be written. But in such a tablet nothing is actually written. Therefore neither is anything in the intellect, I hold, considered as it is possible.

            Again, it is clear by the argument that as it is in the senses so it is in the intellect. But there is no sensible innately in the senses, since this would impede the senses. Therefore etc.

            Again, as matter is related to particular forms, so the intellect is related to universal forms. But matter has no particular form in actuality. Therefore etc. But whoever says that the possible intellect has an intelligible in actuality ignores the signification of this word “possible,” since the possible as such is only suited to receive all things, and such a thing is empty of all things.

            As to the arguments, to the first, when it is said that before all teaching etc., I hold that it does not have any cognition in such a way that the intellect has some intelligible innately within itself. Still, there is an order in the genus of intelligibles, because first principles are understood first, and so they are not cognized through any argument but offer themselves immediately to the intellect. But those which are intelligible secondarily are cognized through argument, and so, strictly speaking we understand first principles, but learn the others. Hence I reply to the major premise that it is falsely assumed to the extent that it is assumed that if anything is not cognized through argument and teaching, then its cognition is innate, for first principles are not cognized through teaching, and yet their cognition is not innate.

            As to the third, when it is said through the Commentator that first principles etc., I reply that first principles are called innate not because they are in the nature of the soul, but because they offer themselves immediately to the intellect, and are understood first by the intellect and are the causes of the intelligibility of all the others. The same remarks make it clear how to reply to the second argument.

Question 5

            It is asked whether the intellect is a material power.

            And it is argued that it is by the argument of Avicebron: Everything in which several things share is caused by something primary in their genus. Now several things, namely matter and intellect, share in the reception of forms and potential being. Therefore this reception is caused by something primary in their genus. But such a thing is the matter of the intellect. Therefore, since it is a receptive power, it is a material power.

            Again, a power that is not abstracted from matter is material. But the intellect is a power not abstracted from matter. Therefore etc.

            Again, every power abstracted [i.e. withdrawn] from matter according to its nature is actually understanding and actually understood. But the intellect is not always actually understanding, since it is sometimes potential. Nor is it always actually understood since it does not understand itself except by understanding another, and it does not always understand another, therefore it does not [always] understand itself.

            Again, what is actually understood is not withdrawn from matter, therefore neither is the intellect. The consequence is clear. Proof of the antecedent: What is actually one is not diversified except in accord with matter. But an actual understanding is one in actuality. Let it be assumed, then, that the same thing is understood by you and by myself. Then that thing is diverse in you and myself. Therefore the intellect is also diverse in you and myself, and consequently the intellect will have matter.

            On the other hand, it is argued that whatever is neither body nor a power in a body is an immaterial power. But the intellect is like this. Therefore etc.

            It must be understood that the intellect is not matter, nor is it something that has matter, nor does it arise through the capacities of matter.

            Proof of the first: the intellect receives universal forms, but matter receives particular forms, therefore etc. Again, this is clear from the intellect’s manner of reception, inasmuch as matter receives through changing, but the intellect does not, therefore etc. Again, privation is connected with matter, and privation is the principle of change, and therefore there is a principle of change in matter, and there is no principle of change in the intellect; therefore etc.

            And I prove that the intellect does not have matter because matter does not give being. If it is thus, there will be both matter and form in the intellect, so that by reason of matter it receives being, and by reason of the form it gives being. But it is only part of the soul as it gives being. If, then, it only gives being as a part, and not as it is a whole, not as it is a whole is it part of the soul, which is contrary to the Philosopher, where he says “concerning part of the soul etc.” [429a10].

            Again, neither does it arise through the capacities of matter, and this is explained by the argument of Avicenna: A universal has being in some manner. I ask whether a universal exists in the intellect or in a reality outside the intellect. Not in a reality, since then realities would be universal in actuality, and could move the intellect of themselves, and thus an agent intellect would be unnecessary, and this is false. So the universal is in the intellect. Therefore the intellect is universal, and separated; and consequently it does not arise through the capacities of matter.

            Now it is true that there is in the intellect something material and something formal, for in everything other than the First what it is and that by which it is differ. So in everything other than the First there is some composition, and therefore there is something material in the intellect, that is, that possible intellect, and something formal, that is, the agent intellect.

            In response to the arguments: as to the first, when it is argued that everything which is shared in etc., I reply that the major premise is true, if it is shared univocally and according to the same form, and not equivocally. To the minor premise, I reply that reception and such is shared by prime matter and the intellect equivocally, since prime matter receives forms through changing, but the intellect through apprehension. Again, there is a difference, because the intellect receives universal forms, and matter particular forms. Again, matter is the subject of the forms it receives, but the intellect is not.

            As for the second argument, when it is argument that every power etc., I reply that every power that is entirely abstracted [from matter] is understanding and understood. The Philosopher says this in Metaphysics XII, that everything separated is immediately being and immediately one in number, giving and receiving, understanding and understood. But the intellect is not separated in this way, though, since it does not use any bodily organ, it is still a power of a form that perfects matter.

            As for the third argument, I deny the antecedent of the proof. When it is claimed that whatever is one in form etc., I answer that this is true in the case of these material things, for here what is one according to form differs only through matter. And you reply, what is understood is one according to form. I hold that it is not necessary that what is understood be actually withdrawn from matter, and although it differs, this is not through matter, or in such a way that we can speak contradicting the first proposition and the second in the same way. And when you say that what is understood is different in me and in you, therefore it is another in me than it is in you, I reply that what is understood is the same, but the species is other by which it is understood by me and by you. And you will say, “it is all the same, for I have a doubt concerning this species, since if it is a different species in me and you, then this is through matter.” I reply that it is not necessary [that it occur through matter], that this species is another than that merely because it is in different intellects, for it is like whiteness, which in this part of matter is other, and other in number from the whiteness in another part of matter, but is still the same in species with it. In the same way, what is understood by me is the same in species as what is understood by another, but different in number since it is united to the other.

Question 6

            It is asked next whether the intellect is the form of a material substance.

            And it is argued that it is not, as the Philosopher intends in Metaphysics VII (1045b16 ff.), the cause why the composite is truly one is that the matter attains to actuality through the form, so that the agent draws out the form, which is in the potentiality of the matter, from the matter. But the matter does not attain to actuality through the intellect, since intellect is not drawn from it. The intellect, then, does not becomes truly one in this way.

            Again, the Philosopher intends that the composite does not function through the form alone. But the intellect functions by itself alone and understands the whole. Now the composite does not understand through itself, since if it did, the act of understanding would not be more abstract than the act of sensing. Therefore etc.

            Again, the intellect exists per se, therefore it does not inhere by nature in another. I prove the conclusion: whatever one contrary is in, what is contrary to it will not be in that by nature. To subsist per se and to inhere are contrary opposites. Therefore whatever per se subsistence is in, inherence will not be in it. But the intellect subsists per se, and therefore it does not inhere in anything. But the form inheres by nature in matter; therefore the intellect is not the form of any matter.

            Again, every form which is a perfection of matter is brought forth through change. But the intellect is not brought forth through change. Therefore it is not the form of the body.

            On the other hand, it is argued that is the form and perfection of a reality by which it differs from other things by a specific difference. But man differs from other things through the intellect, and this is a specific difference. Therefore etc.

            The intention of the Commentator was that the intellect is a separate substance and not the perfection of the body. Still, because he sees that each experiences himself to understand he found a way in which the possible intellect could be joined to us, through images, and the way in which it is joined to us is this, according to him—just as the sensible is related to the senses, so images to the intellect. But the sensible is received in the senses, thus the image is received in the intellect, and so the same in species is in the image and in the intellect, and as it is in the intellect it is its form. Hence he seemed to argue thus, whatever the form of something is joined to, that of which it is the form is also joined to it. But the form of the intellect is joined to us. Therefore the intellect is joined to us in some way. And in this way he took it that a human being can understand. Last, since the intellect is a substance separated from us, he took it that one person does not differ from another through the possible intellect, but through the passive intellect which is the cogitative power, and he assumed this intellect to be by corrupted upon the corruption of the body, but not the possible intellect.

            This can't be right, since it cannot preserve in any way human understanding. For just as sensibles are related to the senses, so images are related to the intellect. But even though the senses abstract species from sensibles, it is not because of this that they sense sensibles. Therefore even though the intellect abstracts intelligible species from images it is not because of this that it understands images, or even ourselves through images. For if the image is the principle of understanding intrinsic to us, since it is necessary to understand the principle of understanding, it is necessary to understand the image; but it does not understand it; therefore etc.

            Again, the species which is in the image is only the principle of understanding insofar as it is intelligible, but it is not intelligible as it is in the image; therefore it is not the principle of understanding in us as it is in the image. Therefore, if we understand, it is necessary to say that the intellect is in us.

            Now what he says, that the intellect is a separated substance, is not true, since if it were we would not need the senses in understanding, for the manner of being presupposes action, and the manner of action. Therefore whatever has being separated from matter has action separated from matter. If, then, the intellect were to be separated in being, it would understand in separation, and thus it would not need the senses. Again, if the our intellect were separated, it would understand itself through itself, just as other separated substances understand themselves. But this is not true, since nothing is actually intelligible before our intellect learns or discovers, but if it understood itself through its substance, something would be intelligible before learning or discovery.