Questions on De Interpretatione

By Simon of Faversham

Ed. Mazarella, pp. 151-170.

Translated by John Longeway

[Translator’s Note: As we have the text it contains two recensions of similar material, the first done up rather sketchily, in the style of a literal commentary with questions inserted from time to time, the second in Simon’s usual style, questions alone, fully developed and worked out. The two recensions seem to agree on the topics dealt with and the treatment of the topics, as though one were preliminary notes for the other. I have ignored the division of the text into questions in the edition, then, to add my own divisions, which reflect this structure.]

“First it is necessary to establish” etc.

Note that passions of the soul are taken in three ways. In one way an appetite existing the sensitive part of the soul is called a passion—of this sort are anger and hatred such. “Passion” is not taken here in this first way, when it is said “Words are marks of passions” etc. Nor is it taken in the second way, namely for a similitude. Words do not signify similitudes of realities, but the realities themselves. We signify those things through words that we understand through them, but we understand through them true realities, and hence the Philosopher takes passion as realities understood. And they are called passions because they imply a certain passion of the intellect, so that the words are signs of passions, that is, of understood realities, to the senses.

And a doubt is raised concerning what he says, that “a name is an utterance.”

For it seems that it is not an utterance (vox), since nothing artificial is natural, but a name is something artificial, and an utterance is something natural; therefore etc.

It must be understood that everything artificial is an accident. Accidents, however, must be defined through the substantial, and natural things are the subject of the artificial. Therefore the artificial must be defined through the natural. And therefore name here is defined through utterance as through its subject, so that we say a name is an utterance, but not absolutely and without qualification, but a significative utterance.

To the argument, I reply that an artificial name is natural, not in such a way that the artificial is natural to a natural essence, rather the artificial is natural in this way, as an accident is to its subject.

A doubt is raised concerning this that he says, that “a verb is always a mark of speaking of something else,” because if I say this, “a man runs, therefore he walks” this verb “runs” is said of another thing, and is not a mark of speaking of something else; therefore etc.

It must be understood that the intellect composes and divides things in speech (oratio) which the intellect first grasps with a simple grasp. Now the intellect grasps the whatness of realities with a simple grasp, and therefore composes them together in speech. Therefore what is said of another is another whatness and nature. But that which is a mark of this union is the verb, as it conveys a certain composition, and therefore the Philosopher says that the verb is a mark of speaking of something else.

As for the argument, when you say “a man runs,” etc., I reply that one reality and nature is predicated here of another, hence this has to be exposited thus: “a man is a running thing.”

A doubt is raised concerning this that he says, a verb “consignifies a time . . . because it consignifies being now.”

It seems that this cannot be the cause, since now is not a time; therefore it is not to be said that a verb consignifies a time because it consignifies being now.

I reply that it cannot be taken for an indivisible time, and the Philosopher does not understand it so. But in another way it can be taken for a present time, of which one part is past and another future, as in saying “this day is now” and it is in this way that Aristotle understands a verb to consignify time because it consignifies being now.

Note concerning this that he says a verb is a mark of those which are said “about the subject and are in the subject.” This is because predicates are two-fold, namely essential, and because of this he says that they are said to be of the subject, and accidental, and because of this he says that they are in the subject, and a verb is a mark of either of these.

Note that indefinite names and indefinite verbs are excluded from the consideration of the logician, because the name and verb that a logician considers must be parts of a statement (enuntiatio), but indefinite names and verbs are not parts of a statement, since whatever has to be a part of a statement must signify some concept of the mind. A statement is chiefly on account of the truth, but we cannot have a truth, except through that which a determinate concept expresses. Now indefinite names and verbs do not express any determinate concept, for they are said indifferently of beings and non-beings, and therefore they are not verbs nor names for the logician, and therefore they do not belong to his considerations. But they are not excluded from the consideration of the grammarian, because they have the accidents of a name and verb, and using these accidents they can be established in relation to one another <in a statement>. And the Philosopher hints at this in the text when he says that an indefinite verb is a mark of speaking of something else.

Note that a verb of the present tense is a verb without qualification, because a verb signifies action or the suffering of action, therefore that which signifies action or the suffering of action without qualification is a verb without qualification, and those which do not are not verbs without qualification. But it is only a verb of the present tense that signifies action and the suffering of action without qualification, and therefore this alone is a verb without qualification.

Note concerning this that he says that “it also signifies a certain composition which” etc., that we can attend either to the primary significatum, and thus actual being is its primary significatum, or to the secondary significatum, and thus one attends to what is included in statement, and in this way it signifies a certain composition, which is not to be understood without its composite parts.

Note that speech is not strictly speaking an instrument of the interpretative <i.e. signifying> power, but rather of the intellectual power, because the intellect, using the sentence, arrives at the cognition it seeks. And even though it is not <strictly speaking> an instrument of the interpretative power, still is formally an instrument of the interpretive power using instruments of the interpretive power, some of which are lips, teeth, tongue, palate, throat and lungs.

Note that a statement is defined well through its signifying the true or the false, since a statement is an instrument of the intellect, through which it arrives at a cognition of the true. Now every instrument is best defined through its end, and therefore statement is defined well through its signifying the true and the false.

Note that concerning statement-making speech is to be examined here, since, like all of logic, it is ordered to demonstration. For in demonstration only the true or false is sought, and only statement-making speech is true or false; therefore only about this does logic exert itself.

Note that through this that he says, “Some realities are universal and some particular,” he wishes to say that some realities are signified universally, for instance human nature through “human being,” or signified as this same nature is signified through “Socrates.”

Note concerning this that “it is not the same to say that ‘no human being is white’ and ‘no one is white,’” that the negation introduced by the “no” cannot be referred principally to the reality signified by the verb, and so “no human being” signifies the same as “no one,” if it refers formally to the composition; if not, it does not signify the same as “no one.”

It is asked about the book On Interpretation, and since the Philosophy says that utterances are marks of passions which are in the soul, therefore it is asked whether utterances signify realities existing outside the soul or passions of realities.

And it is argued that they signify realities. For the Philosopher says in On Sophistical Refutations I that we use names in the place of realities, but this would not be unless utterances signified realities; therefore etc.

Again, the Philosopher says that a stone is not in the soul, but the species of stone is. Now if “stone” does not signify a reality outside the soul, but only a species of stone, then a stone is in the soul. Therefore etc.

The opposite is argued through the intention of the Philosopher, who says that utterances are marks of passions which are in the soul; therefore utterances signify passions.

Again, this is argued by reason, for a relation does not remain when one of its related terms is destroyed. But signification is a relation of the significant utterance to that which is signified. Therefore, when what is signified is destroyed, the signification of the word will not remain. If, therefore, that which is signified by an utterance were a reality outside the soul, then when that thing is destroyed, the signification will not remain. But this is false, since even when there is no existing rain, “rain”will signify them same thing it did before. Therefore etc.

It must be replied to this that there are two genera of realities, as was said of old, some are realities of primary intention, and some are realities of secondary intention.

Realities of primary intention are those which would have being even if the soul did not. Realities of the second intention are those which would not have being if the soul did not, and such are logical intentions, namely genus, species and the like. Hence, logic is said to be about second intentions joined to first intentions. And thus there are two genera of names, for some are names of primary imposition, for instance, human being and stone, while others are names of secondary imposition, for instance, genus and species etc.

It is plain that names of secondary imposition do not signify realities outside the soul, but there is a doubt concerning names of primary imposition, whether they signify a reality outside the soul. And I hold that they signify a true reality, and this is obvious because to signify is to establish a concept (intellectum), and therefore an utterance signifies that upon which the concept is established. Now this word, ‘human being,’ establishes a concept of a reality existing outside the soul, and does not establish a concept of a concept of a reality, since if it established a concept of a concept of a reality, then a real predicate such as running could not be made true of a human being. For this speech is false, “A human concept runs.” But this would be its sense, if “human being” signified a concept of a concept of a human being, or “this species of human being runs,” etc. And so “human being” will signify a true reality existing outside the soul.

Again, this is obvious because we signify those things through an utterance that we understand. Now we understand realities themselves and not the species of realities, for the whatness of a reality is what is understood, and therefore the Philosopher says in On the Soul III that the soul discerns magnitude through the senses, but discerns being through the intellect, that is, the whatness of magnitude. Therefore we signify realities and not the species of realities through names.

It must be noted, then, that utterances do not signify a reality according to that formula according to which it has being outside soul, nor according to that formula by which it has being in the soul, but the signify realities absolutely in respect of their what it is absolutely, by setting aside every accident, as is apparent in the case of this name “human being.” And this is apparent because a name signifies that which its definition expresses, because the formula of which the name is a sign, is the definition, as is said in Metaphysics IV. Now the definition signifies a reality insofar as it is without qualification and absolutely, setting aside every accident, therefore a name signifies a reality absolutely, setting aside every accident. But although an utterance may signify a reality absolutely, nonetheless a reality cannot be signified through an utterance, nor can the utterance be imposed upon it, unless it is first conceived by the intellect, and so a reality cannot be signified unless it is first understood. We hold that utterances are marks of passions, that is, of understood realities, not because they signify them under that formula by which they are understood, but because utterances cannot signify a reality unless they are first understood. And therefore, the text of the Philosopher is to be exposited, that utterance are marks of passions in the soul, that is, “utterances are marks of realities understood by the soul,” and realities conceived by the soul are called passions, because they plant a certain passion in the intellect. Speaking of the passion which is health and a perfection, hence they plant passions in the intellect, because they perfect the intellect.

As for the arguments: As to the first, when it is argued, “Utterances are marks” etc., it was said in what way this must be exposited, since utterances are marks of passions, that is, of realities conceived by the soul.

As to the other argument, when it is argued, “a relation does not remain” etc., I grant the whole argument up to “in signifying that which is signified” etc. I reply that it does not follow because a reality is not signified under that being, but an existing reality outside the soul is signified absolutely and not under that formula by which it is outside the soul. And therefore when the reality is destroyed as far as that being is concerned, it is not necessary that the significatum be destroyed.

Next it is asked whether truth and falsehood is a matter of composition and division.

And it is argued that it is not. Being and the true are convertible, but not every being is a matter of composition and division, therefore not everything true is, therefore truth and falsehood are not a matter of division and composition.

Again, the concept itself of what it was to be is always true, therefore etc.

Similarly, the Philosopher says that about its proper object a sense perception is always true. From this I argue: a sense perception is always true concerning its proper object, but a sense perception is not composite, nor divided, therefore truth and falsehood are not only a matter of composition and division.

On the other hand, it is argued: the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VI that “true good and bad,” but it is not in the understanding about what it was to be. And so the Philosopher says two things, namely that true and false are not in things, and that true and false are not in the understanding which grasps simple things. From this I argue: truth is only in the understanding, as the Philosopher says there, but not in the understanding which grasps that which it was to be, as the Philosopher says there; therefore it must be assumed that truth and falsehood are only the understanding which composes and divides; therefore truth and falsehood is only a matter of composition and division.

It must be said in response to this that truth is found in the understanding that grasps and the understanding the composes and divides, for truth is nothing other than conformity of the understanding to the reality, for the understanding is true when it is conformed to the reality which is outside it.

For it is not the case that a reality is such because we understand it to be such, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV, but rather, because the reality is such, we understand it to be so. Let us say, then, that truth is nothing other than conformity of the understanding to the reality. And this is what Avicenna says, that truth is the making equal of realities and the understanding. From this I argue, if truth is conformity of the understanding to the reality, there is truth where conformity of the reality to the understanding is found; but conformity of the understanding to the reality which is grasped is found in the understanding which grasps; therefore etc. Now that the understanding which grasps is in conformity with the reality which it grasps is obvious, for the understanding that grasps the whatness of human being is in conformity with that whatness, since it grasps the whatness as it is; therefore just as the understanding which composes and divides is in conformity with the reality which it composes and divides, so is the understanding which grasps; and before it was said truth is nothing other than conformity of the understanding to the reality, and such is found in the understanding which grasps, therefore etc. But truth is found more principally in the understanding which composes and divides than in that which grasps, since when something is found in several, in one as it were potentially, and in another as it were in actuality, it is found more principally in that in which it is found in actuality than in that in which it is found potentially. But truth is found potentially in that understanding which grasps, and actually in that which composes. The proof of this is that truth in the understanding which composes is complex, and truth in the understanding which grasps is incomplex. Now complex truth is caused from the incomplex, just as that which is actual is caused from that which is potentially. And therefore truth is more principally found in the understanding that composes than in that which grasps.

Again, this is apparent since the operation of the understanding which grasps is ordered to the operation of the understanding which composes and divides. It is reasonable, then, that the truth which is in the understanding which grasps is ordered to the truth which is in the understanding which composes, and therefore it is principally in that which composes.

Truth is found in both understandings, then, but in what way is it found in the understanding? I hold that it is as in something cognizing the truth, for the intellect cognizes the true more principally, and there is truth in what composes as it is that which cognizes the truth. And the Philosopher said that truth and falsehood are a matter of composition and division.

But truth is found in realities as in a subject. For that to which the understanding is referred per se has the formula of the true, since just as the practical understanding naturally strive for the good, so the speculative understanding strive for the true. Now the speculative understanding strives per se for the whatness of a reality, since this is its per se object; therefore the whatness of a reality is in a way called truth, and this way we say that truth is the true being of a reality. Truth, therefore, is not found in a reality taken absolutely, but as it is ordered to the understanding, and because of this Avicenna says that truth is a certain property, which belongs to a reality, according to which the intellect is conformed to it, so that there is no truth in a reality unless it be in its being ordered to some understanding. It appears in this way, then, that truth and falsehood is a matter of composition and division.

In response to the arguments opposed to this view: In response to the first, when it is argued “being and the true etc.,” it must be understood that being and the true are convertible both in nature and in intention, but they differ in formula. That they are convertible in nature is obvious, for as a reality is a being through its substance, as the Commentator proves, so a reality is true through its substance. For let us take some reality: this reality is true, therefore it is either true through its substance or through something added. If through its substance we have what was proposed, and if through something added, since that being is true, then either it is a being through its substance or through something added; if through something added I ask about this, and so there will be an infinite regress, or there will be some reality true through its substance, just as it is a being through its substance. Again, true and being are convertible in intention, for just as ‘being’ is used analogously for substance and accident, so also is ‘true’; and so true and being agree in this intention, which is analogous. For through the prior use, ‘true’ is said of substance, and through the posterior use of accident, just as with being. But these differ in formula, for something is called being according to its absolute being, but it is called true as it is ordered to the understanding, for when a reality is really ordered to the understanding, so that the understanding is conformed to it, then the reality is said to be true. When it is argued, “being and true are convertible,” then, this is true as regards the reality, but they differ in formula. And I grant the minor premise, but the argument does not follow, “therefore truth is not etc.,” since that which ‘truth’ indicates it indicates as ordered to the understanding, but this is not the case with ‘being.’

In response to the other argument: “The Philosopher says in De Anima III that the understanding etc.” I grant that truth is in the understanding which grasps what it is, nevertheless it is more principally in the understanding that composes and divides than in the understanding that grasps.

In response to the other argument: When it is argued, “a sense perception is always true concerning its proper object,” without doubt this is true, for just as the intellect is conformed to the reality which it understands, so the sense perception is conformed to the reality which it senses. Therefore the sense perception has conformity to what is sensed, and since truth is a certain conformity, it is necessary to posit some truth in a sense perception in a certain way, insofar as it is in conformity with its sensible. But even if a sense perception be in conformity with its sensible, still the sense does not cognize this conformity, and therefore the conformity to its sensible that is in the sense perception will not be in the sense perception as in that which cognizes it, but it is only found in the understanding as that which cognizes it. From this it is apparent that truth is found in things and speech and in the understanding, but in nothing except the understanding as in that which cognizes it, and strictly speaking truth and falsehood are in a reality as in what cognizes them. And since truth is more principally in the understanding which composes and divides than in that which grasps composition and division, therefore the Philosopher says it is a matter of composition and division, as if to say, truth is in nothing principally except in the composing and dividing understanding.

Next, we inquire about the part “A name, therefore is an utterance” etc. In which the Philosopher, mentioning indefinite names, excludes them from any formula. And his argument is that an indefinite name is said equally of beings and non-beings. And nothing like that is a name, since a name must express a definite concept, and the same is true of a verb. Therefore it is asked whether an indefinite name posits (ponit) anything.

And it is argued that it does, since the Philosopher in Prior Analytics I, in the chapter “There is some difference in constuing,” he says that being non-equal and not being equal are not the same, since something falls under that which is being non-equal. Now non-equal is an indefinite name. Therefore, something falls under an indefinite name. But this would not happen unless an indefinite name posited something. Therefore etc.

Again, the Philosopher says in On Interpretation 2 that from an indefinite predicate there follows the negation of a definite predicate, for it follows that a human being is non-just, therefore a human being is not just, and this does not convert, since upon the negation of a definite predicate an affirmation of an indefinite predicate does not follow. Now if an indefinite name posits nothing more than a negative name, as seems to be the case, upon a negative concerning a definite predicate there follows an affirmative concerning an indefinite predicate. Since then it does not follow, as it seems, it is of the intention of the Philosopher that an indefinite name posits something .

On the other hand, it is argued that if an indefinite name were to posit something, then this consequence would be good: Every human is an animal, therefore a stone exists (est). But it is obvious that this consequence is not good, therefore it is obvious that an indefinite name posits nothing. Proof that the consequence is good: Given this, that it follows by contraposition that “Every human is an animal, therefore every non-animal is non-human,” I argue from this, “Every non-animal is non-human, a stone is non-animal, therefore a stone is non-human.” But you will say that “non-human” posits something. It is argued, therefore, “a stone is non-human, therefore a stone exists.” Therefore, from the first to the last, if an indefinite name were to posit something, it follows that if every man is an animal, a stone exists.

I reply to this that no indefinite name posits anything definite as existing. An indefinite name is imposed by negation of a form, hence, because it is imposed by negation of a form, since the negation of a form is equally said of a being and a non-being, since someone denying a form denies

every determination, therefore an indefinite name is equally said of a being and a non-being. But if an indefinite term were imposed by privation of form, it would not be said of anything, unless it were suited by nature to be coincident with the form. So “just” is said of nothing except what is suited by nature to coincide with justice. And because of this the negative of the removed predicate does not follow on the negation of an indefinite predicate, for it does not follow, “wood is not just,” therefore “wood is non-just <i.e. unjust>.” Thus it appears therefore that an indefinite name is not imposed from the privation of form, but from a denial, and therefore it posits nothing definite. And because of this Boëthius says in his commentary that when I say, “non-man,” I destroy the present form, and leave behind indefinite others. For through “non-man” I can understand horse, cow, chimera and such. But I leave behind indefinite forms, since every form other than human being, and so I posit nothing definite, and thus an indefinite name posits nothing definite.

It must be noted also that insofar as any name is less common, the indefinite name produced from it will be more common. For example, “Socrates” is predicable of something unique, but “non-Socrates” is predicable of everything other than Socrates, for instance, of man, lion and others. And insofar as a name is more common, the indefinite name produced from it is less common, hence, “human being” is more common than Socrates, and “non-human” is less common than “non-Socrates.” We can say “non-Socrates” of something of which we cannot truly say “non-human,” since we can truly say that “Plato is not Socrates,” but we cannot truly say that “Plato is not human.” And since “being” is most common of all, the indefinite name produced from it is sayable of nothing. And because the ancients assumed that indefinite names cannot be produced from transcendent names, because nothing is left. It is clear, then, what must be said, that an indefinite name posits nothing determinate.

In response to the arguments: As for the first, when it is argued “being non-equal” etc., the words of the Philosopher there are true concerning composite terms, but not concerning simple terms. For he does not intend that something should fall under this being non-equal taken per se, but that it falls under this whole composite, which is non-equal. Something falls under wood, but not by reason of this, that it is non-equal, but by reason of this that it is wood. And more will appear about this below. But in a negation saying “not being equal to wood,” wood is not posited by virtue of the word, nor is any other.

As for the other, when it is argued, “upon an affirmative” etc., I reply that the rule has truth in composite terms, as also the previous one, and therefore he says below when he says “that upon an affirmative” etc., as was said in the resolutions. And therefore as the words of the Philosopher were to be understood in composites in the earlier, in a similar way here.

Next it is asked whether an oblique name is a name.

And it is argued that it is, since whatever is the subject of a statement is a name, but an oblique name is the subject of a statement; therefore etc. The major premise is proved: The Philosopher says in the beginning of On Interpretation 2 that every statement signifies something about something. But that about which something is a name. Therefore etc. The Philosopher, then, intends that whatever is the subject of a statement is a name. The minor premise is clear from speaking thus, “of opposites there is one discipline.”

Again, with whatever the definition of name agrees, that is a name. But the definition of a name agrees with an oblique name, since an oblique name is an utterance significant by convention of which no part is significant by itself, but this is the definition of name; therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is argued, the case of a name is not a name, but an oblique name is a case of a name, as the grammarians say; therefore etc.

It must be replied to this that “oblique name” can be taken in two ways, either as it calls under the consideration of the grammarian, or as it falls under the consideration of a logician. If it be taken in the first way, an oblique name is a name. And the reason for this is that a part is a part through its mode of signifying, and this indicates the first part of the minor. For it says a part is a part through construction, but construction arises through a mode of signifying, and therefore a part is a part through a mode of signifying. And therefore that which has the specific mode of signifying of a name, that will be placed under the species of name. But an oblique name has the specific mode of signifying of a name, because the specific mode of signifying of a name is to signify through the mode of a qualified substance, as the specific mode of signifying of a pronoun is to signify through the mode of subject matter. But to signify through the mode of a qualified substance is to signify through the mode of something permanent, and this as it is taken under a determine grasp. But to signify thus through the mode of a qualified substance does not coincide with both direct and oblique names. For just as “human being” signifies through the mode of a qualified substance, so also “of a human being.” And therefore just as a direct is a name according to the consideration of a grammarian, so is an oblique name.

But if an oblique name is taken as it is under the consideration of a logician, thus an oblique name is not name, since when some artisan chiefly considers some end, nothing is considered per se by that artisan, except what is ordered to that end per se. Now it happens that significant statement of the true or false is the end of a logician. For it is this that the logician aims at in the end, namely to consignify the true or false, which is signified through significant statement. And because of this demonstration , through which truth is acquired, is the end of the logician’s business. And therefore nothing is per se of the consideration of the logician, unless it is expressive of truth and falsity, or is that according to which the true and the false can be expressed. But the true and the false cannot be expressed through an oblique name, but rather <only> through a direct name. And because of this the Philosopher says in the text that, if an oblique name is added to a verb, truth or falsity is not caused, as for instance when one says “of Cato <is>,” for this is neither true nor false, I hold. But if someone says “Cato is there,” it signifies something true or false. So an oblique name is not a name according to the logician. The logician says that that is a noun which, by addition of a verb, there can be caused truth or falsity, but by addition of a verb to an oblique name truth or falsity is not caused; therefore etc.

But someone might ask why it is that truth and falsity are not caused by the addition of an oblique name to a verb. I reply that truth extends per se to those which are per se and principal object of the intellect, since the true is the good of the intellect. But a per se object of the intellect is a whatness of a reality as it is whatness absolutely per se. Therefore speaking from the addition of those names to a verb truth and falsity are caused, which signify the whatness of a reality absolutely. But direct names are of this sort. The genitive does not signify a reality absolutely, but as something is of it; the dative, as something is acquired for it; the accusative, as that to or upon which, the ablative, as that by which. Therefore that which signifies the whatness absolutely is the nominative, and therefore by the addition of this alone to the verb is the true and the false caused. And so the Philosopher says that, if it is said that “of Cato is,” this is neither true nor false.

Again, this is explained thus: that strictly speaking signifies the true and the false which establishes an understanding, so that those who hear are at rest. Now from the addition of a nominative name to a verb there is caused a denominative understanding, so that he who hears is at rest, as when it is said, “a human being reads.” But from the addition of something oblique to the verb, an understanding is not established, so that one who hears is at rest, because from the addition of the genitive to the verb, saying “of a human being,” it is not given to the intellect that “this is this,” but it is given to the intellect “being of this.” But in saying “being of this,” not determinate understanding is established, so that one who hears is at rest. And so from the addition of an oblique noun to a verb truth and falsity are not caused, unless it be under a nominative or express understanding, and therefore an oblique name is not a name under the consideration of a logician. So the argument stands on this: That strictly speaking signifies the true or the false, from the addition of which to the verb an understanding is established, so that one who hears rests; but from the addition of the nominative alone is such an understanding established; therefore etc.

As to the arguments: To the first, when it is argued, “the subject of a statement” etc., I reply that the primary and per se subject of a statement is a name. And you say “that an oblique name” etc. I reply that this does not occur unless it is in virtue of a direct name. And you say, “Of opposites is the same discipline.” It must be replied that, is due order is preserved, “the same discipline” is the subject.

As for the other argument, when it is argued, “To whatever it agrees” etc., I reply that an oblique name agrees with every part of the definition of name, because it must first be added what was said above, namely “finite and direct,” and this part, “direct,” does not agree with oblique names.

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