Questions on the Posterior Analytics: First Set

By Simon of Faversham.

Translated by John Longeway

Proemium

            As the Philosopher says in Book X of the Ethics, a life with leisure for contemplation of the truth is the happy and perfect life, and better than a life according to the nature of a human being, for one with leisure for the contemplation of truth does not live in accord with the nature of a human being, but in accord with something divine in him. And I hold that he does not live in accord with the nature of a human being, for since a human being has a twofold nature, namely a sensitive and an intellective nature, the life proper to a human being seems to consist in this, that one should order all one’s functions according to reason, directing them to the best end possible. But to have leisure for the function of the intellect alone seems proper to divine separated substances, in which only the intellective nature is found. A human being, therefore, through continuous function of its reason and intellect, is made deiform, for no other function is proper to God besides speculation, as the Philosopher says in Book X of the Ethics, in which he rules out the opinion of some who say that human beings ought to aim at wisdom in human affairs, and mortal beings at wisdom in mortal affairs. Because of this the opinion of certain men, who say that a man ought to direct his attention to becoming wise in human affairs, and a mortal to wisdom in mortal things, is ruled out. For these are not the only things to be attended to, but from the cognition of material beings one ought to proceed to the cognition of immortal and divine beings, for the human intellect acquires its perfection most of all when, through continuous use of speculative reason, it is both joined to superior things and rises from inferior things, and so in a certain way all things are embraced. Because of this the expositor says, on Book X of the Ethics, that although the intellect lacks the magnitude of a moveable thing, it exceeds everything else in a human being in the quantity of its power. It is absurd, then, for human beings not to pursue their own perfection in accord with the intellect. Noting this elsewhere, the Philosopher said that the other animals certainly experience lust and anger and the rest, but none of them except human beings have reasoning. And he says further that it would be most absurd, then, if we were cheerfully to abandon such a good, and give up these things alone, because of the indifference of mean detractors.

            But it must be noted that, in seeking the perfection of our intellect, this aforementioned order must be followed. For the perfection of the intellect is to know and understand, but it is not possible to know anything except through the cognition of a cause, since, in all sciences of which there are principles or causes or elements, it is necessary to understand and to know starting from the cognition of these causes.

            It is therefore necessary for the intellect to begin from the consideration of causes and principles, considering what is the immediate cause of each effect and what is not, and in what way it is possible to demonstrate the effect through the cause and in what way it is not.

            But the intellect cognizes this from those things which are determined in the Posterior Analytics, which we have before us now, and therefore this science which treats of demonstration is necessary to the perfection of the intellect.

            For this science is among the sciences as are correct rules among things relating to architecture, for through this science everything which is to be demonstrated in the particular sciences is regulated, since unless it is done with attention to this science nothing is properly discovered or taught in the other sciences.

            And therefore philosophers have need of demonstration as a kind of tool (organum) for setting the parts of philosophy aright. Again, Ptolemy makes the utility of this science sufficiently known in the Almagest, where he says that one ought not to fill one’s soul with probable things and matters of opinion alone, since they do not lead to any firm disposition in the soul, but rather with demonstrated things, and certain things, which make the intellect sure and stable.

            The way in which this is done, however, appears from the things set out in this science, so that this among the logical writings is, according to natural desires, to be desired and sought out more than the others.

Question 1

            On this subject, then, we first ask whether a logician can teach the art of demonstrating.

            And it is argued that a logician cannot, since teaching the art of demonstrating does not belong to anyone to whom the consideration of principles of demonstration does not belong. But the consideration of principles of demonstration does not belong to the logician, since the principles of demonstration are true, immediate propositions proper to a science, and such do not belong to the consideration of a logician, since the logician’s craft is common to many sciences; therefore etc.

            Again, that science which teaches the art of demonstrating must be the most certain. But logic is not the most certain, since according to the Philosopher logic, since it concerns inquiry (sit inquisitiva), has the way to the principles of all methods. But a science that inquires (inquisitiva scientia) is not the most certain science, since everyone who inquires is in doubt. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand: it is argued that knowing does not occur except through demonstration, so teaching the way to demonstrate and the art of demonstrating belongs to whomever teaching the way of coming to know (modum sciendi) belongs. But teaching the way of coming to know belongs to the logician, for the logician teaches the way of coming to know in each of the sciences. Therefore etc.

            It must be understood here that although a science and the way of coming to know that science differ in the other sciences, they are nevertheless one in logic, so that logic, although it is a science, is the way of coming to know with regard to the other sciences as well as itself. And it is clear that of necessity one arrives at some science in which the science and the way of coming to know do not differ. For let there be some science: I ask whether this science and the way of coming to know this science are the same or differ. If they are the same I have what was proposed. If the science and the way of coming to know it differ, it is necessary that there be a science of this way of coming to know; for there is no way of coming to know which is not in a knower, but a knower is not a knower except through some scientific knowledge, so that there will be a science of the way of coming to know. And then I will ask about the science of that way of coming to know, whether the science and its way of coming to know are the same. If they are the same I have what was proposed, namely, that one arrives at some science in which the science does not differ from it way of coming to know. If the science and its way of coming to know differ, there will be a science of this way of coming to know, and then I shall ask about that science and its way of coming to know as before, and so it will either proceed without limit or one will arrive some science in which the science and the way of coming to know do not differ.

            But to proceed thus without limit in sciences, because there is a way of coming to know anterior to each science, is absurd, since then no one would have scientific knowledge except by chance, which is clear since no one would have anything sufficient to direct him how to come to any science. But this is false, for logic is sufficient to direct one, and therefore it is necessary that we arrive at some science in which the science and its way of coming to know are the same, and we call this science logic. Logic, then, is a science in itself and a way of coming to know as regards the other sciences, and also a way of coming to know as regards itself. For we see that the intellect understands itself in understanding other things, so that it reflects upon itself and its act, and because of this, since logic is the correctness (rectitudo) of an act of reason, it sets other sciences right as well as itself.

            So this is a way of coming to know as regards other sciences, and is also a way of coming to know as regards itself. So logic, in treating of the way of demonstrating according to which other sciences proceed, also proceeds itself in the demonstrative mode, so that the other sciences take from logic the way of demonstrating in accord with which they proceed, but logic does not take its way of demonstrating from another science, but from the way of experience, since, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics I, “Science and art come to men through experience, for, as Polus rightly says, ‘Experience made art, but inexperience luck’,” from which it is clear that the science and its way of coming to know do not differ in logic.

            Then, in response to the question, when it is asked whether logic can teach the art of demonstrating, I maintain that it can. For the correctness of each science consists in its proving properties (proprietates) of its subject demonstratively. Teaching the art of demonstrating in all of the sciences, then, belongs to him to whom setting all other sciences right as regards the way of knowing and demonstrating belongs, but setting all other sciences right as regards the way of coming to know and demonstrating belongs to the logician; therefore etc.

            Again, this is explained by an argument that Albert touches on: Every science which passes on a perfect cognition of something has to consider the ultimate and the best end of that which it considers, but logic passes on a perfect cognition of the art of syllogizing, as is obvious from the plan of the Philosopher’s work (processu Philosophi) in the Prior Analytics; therefore it is the business of the logician to consider the ultimate and best end in the art of syllogizing. But the art of demonstrating is the last and best in the art of syllogizing, for the science of the syllogism is ordered to the science of demonstration. Noting this a certain Greek expositor of the Posterior Analytics says that demonstration is the end of the logician’s business, for Aristotle passes down the other logical texts to us for the sake of demonstration. And Albert says, further on in the same place, that this science which teaches the art of demonstrating is the last and best power of all of logic, therefore it belongs to the logician to consider demonstration or the art of demonstrating.

            Now the part of logic that is about the art of demonstrating is different from the other parts of logic, for the science which is about the other parts of logic is both a teaching science (docens) and a science in use (utens). It is a teaching science since it teaches from what things and from what sort of things demonstration arises, and how they are related; but it is not a science in use since demonstration as regards its use is from principles proper to the science in which it occurs. Logic, however, is from proper principles in no part of it, but rather from common principles. And therefore the science of demonstration is not a science in use, strictly speaking, but it treats the science of the art of demonstrating, the use of which is provided to the other particular sciences. So just as we see in the art of the smith that there is a certain special art of fabricating a hammer or mallet, the use of which is provided to all those who make things afterwards, so there is an art for discovering the art of demonstrating, the use of which is provided to all the special sciences; therefore the science of the art of demonstrating is strictly speaking a teaching science and not a science in use.

            In response to the arguments opposed to this view: in response to the first, when it is argued “One to whom the consideration does not etc.,” this is true. And when it is said, “but the consideration etc. does not belong to the logician,” I maintain that this is by no means true, since principles of demonstration are propositions that are per se, primary, and true, and the logician knows such propositions, as is clear from the intention of the Philosopher here. And as for the proof of this, I maintain that although the logician does not proceed from principles proper without qualification, he still proceeds from principles proper to the subject genus which he considers. For the proper subject genus which the logician considers in this science is demonstration. Although the logician, then, does not proceed from the proper principles of some special demonstration, he still proceeds from the proper principles of demonstration considered as demonstration, and through these he treats the art of demonstrating.

            In response to the second argument, when it is argued, “That science which teaches the art etc.,” I grant this. And you say that logic is not the most certain science. I maintain that logic as regards this part is the most certain science, and even more. According to Albert this science exceeds all the others both in the admirableness of its subject and the certitude of its demonstration--in the admirableness of its subject because here is treated the cognition of a subject which every other science necessarily uses, and similarly in the certitude of its demonstration because, according to Albert, it is reasonable that where the logician teaches the way to demonstrate and laws of demonstration, there he advances more certain demonstrations. Nor do I speak of demonstrations of the arts, for these are more certain in mathematics, but I speak of demonstration which, as it were, is produced (inducta) in men by nature and perfected by the way of experience. And you say “logic, since it concerns inquiry etc.” I maintain that the logician speaks there of dialectic, and this does concern inquiry, so that I grant that it is not most certain.

Question 2

            It is asked whether anyone can discover or acquire the art of demonstrating from scratch (de novo).

            And it is argued that no one can, since, if anyone could acquire the art of demonstrating from scratch, this could not occur except through demonstration, since every art is possessed through demonstration. But no one can acquire the art of demonstrating through another prior demonstration. Therefore the acquisition of the demonstrative art is not possible. The major premise is obvious. The minor is proved since if anyone could acquire the art of demonstrating through another prior demonstration, that prior demonstration would be either known or unknown. If it is known, then he knew how to demonstrate before he found the art of demonstrating, which seems absurd. If it is unknown to him, then he cannot acquire the art of demonstrating for himself from that demonstration. Therefore it seems that a man cannot acquire the art of demonstrating through a demonstration.

            Again, one does not have knowledge of a conclusion unless he first knows that he has a demonstration directed to (ad) that conclusion; therefore one does not acquire the art of demonstrating for himself unless he first knows he has a demonstration directed to the art of demonstrating. If, then, one acquires the art of demonstrating, he first knew he had the art of demonstrating before he h