Scriptum super libros Posteriorum

by Walter Burleigh

translated by John Longeway, from

the edition of Pamphilius de Montebononiensis, Venice 1514

          Chapter 4

          [I.4 73a21-24] "Now since it is impossible, etc." (Quoniam autem impossibile etc.) In this chapter it is proven that every demonstration is from necessary <propositions>. This is proven thus: Every syllogism producing knowing is from necessary propositions, every demonstration is a syllogism producing knowing; therefore every demonstration is from necessary propositions. Proof of the major <premise>: Every syllogism producing knowing concludes that which it is impossible should be otherwise, but that which it is impossible should be otherwise is necessary; therefore every syllogism producing knowing concludes something necessary. But it would not be necessary unless it arose from necessary <propositions>, therefore every syllogism producing knowing is from necessary <premisses>.

          [I.4 73a24-33] And since the necessary is found beforehand (prius) and principally in propositions having perfect unity, and in others that are first truths (?), therefore it is necessary to know what "in every case" is, and what "per se" is, and what "universal in every case" is, as these are known in demonstration. "In every case," then, is not what inheres in something, to be sure, but does not <inhere> in something else, nor, indeed, does it sometimes inhere, and sometimes not, but it is what is in every case and always. Hence, a unity of times and a unity of supposita is required for what is "in every case" as it is taken by one who demonstrates, but only a unity of supposita is required for what is "in every case" as it is taken in the Prior Analytics.

          [I.4 73a34-b5] "Per se" is said in four ways, two of which are ways of predicating (dicendi) or inhering according to Grosseteste. The third is a way of being, the fourth is a way of causing. Hence, according to Grosseteste only two are ways of predicating (dicendi). The first way of saying per se occurs when the predicate falls in the definition of the subject, and it is a true definition of the subject, as, for instance, in "A man is an animal." The second way of saying per se occurs when the subject falls in the definition of the predicate, for instance, in "A man is able to laugh." Hence when a proper passion is predicated of its proper subject, then it is the second way of predicating per se, since then the subject falls in the definition of the predicate. For in the definition of a proper passion, and of every accident, there is placed its proper subject. But it is not always the second way <of saying per se> when the subject falls in the definition of the predicate, for in that case this would be per se, "An animal is a man," and then every animal would be a man. But in order that the proposition be per se it is required also that what is suited by nature to be subject be subject without qualification. Nor always in the second way of predicating per se does the subject fall <in the definition of the subject>, for the superior passion is predicated of the inferior, and the inferior does not fall in the definition of the superior passion. But in the second way, either the subject falls in the definition of the predicate or is contained under the subject that falls in the definition of the predicate. Hence in the second way of predicating per se the passion is predicated of its proper subject or of something contained under its proper subject.

          [I.4 73b5-9] The third way of saying per se is a way of being, and in this way it is said that the first substance is per se, for it stands per se, that is, by itself (solitarie).

          [I.4 73b10-15] The fourth way is a way of causing, and it occurs when there is an efficient cause of the predicate in the subject. For instance, a wounded person dies, or one who is killed perishes because of being killed. For if someone dies solely from a wound, then the wound is the cause of death, and this is the fourth way of saying per se.

          But according to the exposition of the distinguished doctor Thomas Aquinas there are three ways of saying per se, namely the first, second and fourth. And he understands these ways thus: Per se is either that which is by itself, and he takes it in this way in the third way which is a way of being; or in another way it is taken as it indicates how things stand with the formal cause, for instance, this man lives through his soul; and sometimes it indicates how things stand with the material cause, for instance, this wall is white through its surface; and sometimes it indicates how things stand with an efficient cause, for instance, this water is hot through fire. If "per" indicates how things stand with the formal cause (41va), it is the first way, for in the first way of saying per se the definition or a part of it is predicated of what is defined, for every part of the definition is a cause in respect of the defined. But if "per" indicates the relation with the material cause, in this way it is the second way, for in the second way the passion is predicated of its subject, for the subject is matter in respect of the passion. But if "per" indicates the situation with the efficient cause, in this way it is the fourth way.

          But it must be noted that according to the aforesaid doctor Thomas the proposition in which the passion is predicated of the subject is per se with a two-fold per-se-ness. For the subject is in two genera of cause with respect to its proper passion, namely in the genus of material and in the genus of efficient cause. So as the subject is in the genus of material cause in respect of its passion, thus the proposition in which the passion is predicated of its subject is per se in the second way of saying per se. And as the subject is the efficient cause of the predicate, thus such a proposition is per se in the fourth way of saying per se.

          [I.4 73b25-74a4] For every case, through what has been said, it has been shown what the way in which something is said per se is, and how many ways there are, and what "in every case" is. Now the Philosopher shows what "universal" is, saying that the universal is what is in every case and per se and primary. But it must be noted that the universal of which Aristotle speaks here is a passion adequate to the subject, so that it is a convertible passion. Hence a passion is called universal with respect to its primary subject, for it is in every case, per se and primary. A passion is predicated of its proper subject universally, per se, and primarily, as for instance, having three angles etc., and being able to laugh of man.

          Chapter 5

          [I.5 74a5-b4] "But it must not escape our notice etc." (Oportet autem non latere etc.) In this chapter the Philosopher places three errors that occur in understanding (acceptione) of the universal. And these are the errors: The first arises when something common has one suppositum only, if, because of this, its common passion is assigned to being in that suppositum as its primary suppositum. This is the first error. For example, this common term sun has one suppositum, namely this sun, <and it is the first error> if this passion is assigned to this sun as its primary suppositum. The second error arises if some common term has many supposita, and there is no name imposed on these in common, if because of this the passion is assigned to being in one of the supposita as its primary subject. This is the second error. The third error arises when a passion of a superior <genus> is assigned to being in an inferior <one of it species> as its primary subject.

          Chapter 6

          [I.6 74b5-12] "If, then, demonstrative knowledge etc." (Si igitur monstrativa scientia etc.) The sixth conclusion is that a demonstration is from what inheres per se. The conclusion is proven thus: Demonstration is from necessary premisses, but only those things that inhere per se are necessary; therefore demonstration is from what inheres per se. The argument for the major premise is clear through the first conclusion of this book, and other arguments are presented to prove this major premise, though I omit them here. The minor premise is clear inasmuch as those that inhere per se always are, and such are necessary. And those that are accidentally cannot be necessary. Therefore only the per se inherent are necessary.